The Greenspan era : lessons for the future by Toni Lapp
t was a defining event in the histo-
ry of Alan Greenspan’s years as
Chairman of the Federal Reserve
System, said his peer in the world
of central banking. 
Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of
England, had been invited to speak at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s annu-
al economic symposium, a storied event
among economists, academics and central
bankers. The Bank’s 29th annual symposium
was unique in that it would be Greenspan’s
last at the helm of the Federal Reserve
System. Speakers were asked to examine
Greenspan’s Chairmanship as a period of
time, in a conference titled “The Greenspan
Era: Lessons for the Future.” 
Of all the economic shocks that occurred
on Greenspan’s watch—the stock market
collapse of 1987, international financial
crises of the 1990s, the dot-com bubble that
burst in 2000, the terror attacks of Sept. 11,
2001—one salient example of the Greenspan
Fed’s ability to steer the U.S. economy was
much more subtle.
In the mid 1990s, the U.S. economy ex-
perienced a productivity acceleration. The
trend wasn’t proved by data until the late
1990s, but Greenspan was taking note of the
changing conditions as early as 1995.
“Chairman Greenspan did not wait until
1998 to conclude that the underlying rate of
productivity growth might be increasing,”
said King. “The key reason was that he
talked with and listened to people who work
in business.” 
Given the economic conditions of the
day, conventional wisdom would have led any
other economist to support belt-tightening in
the form of higher interest rates, especially
when the unemployment rate dipped, a risk
factor for inflation. Greenspan had to con-
vince the Federal Open Market Committee,
which he chaired, not to raise rates. 
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 “If they had, we might not have gotten the
growth that we got,” noted Craig Hakkio, sen-
ior vice president and director of research for
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
The United States’ underlying rate of pro-
ductivity growth increased from about 1.5
percent to about 2.5 percent in the mid and
late ‘90s. Such an increase in productivity
growth means an increase in the growth rate of
output per worker, thereby boosting a nation’s
standard of living.
Symposium 
Each year, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City invites a select group of experts from
around the globe to discuss economic issues at its
August symposium in the Grand Tetons. Topics
are selected with an eye on relevance to current
economic policy issues; discussions follow in a
free-flowing exchange of ideas. 
This year’s symposium was marked by
buzz that was beginning to build around who
would succeed Greenspan as Chairman, and
participants pondered his extraordinary career
and what lessons could be learned from his
tenure. Greenspan, the second-longest serving
Federal Reserve Chairman, is due to step down
at the end of January.
Perhaps the guest list this year reflected the
sense of history surrounding the event. In ad-
dition to King, participants included
Xiaochuan Zhou, governor of China’s central
bank, attending for the first time; Jean-Claude
Trichet, president of the European Central
Bank, who recalled his experiences with
Greenspan at G7 meetings; and Robert Rubin,
former Treasury secretary, who discussed his
interactions with the Chairman, particularly
during the global financial crises that marked
the 1990s. 
Greenspan’s remarks at the meeting were
general; he recalled his 18 years at the Federal
Reserve, and discussed various indicators used
to guide monetary policy. The discussion led to
his philosophy of risk management—that is,
assessing the many risks to the economy and
the consequences of each and then taking pre-
cautions against those most likely to create
significant damage.
Participants discussed the ramifications
of this policy, including the Federal Reserve’s
move in 2003 to cut the federal funds rate to
1 percent—a historically low level—to pre-
vent the unlikely but potentially dangerous
risk of deflation.
Eyes on the price
Alluding to the housing boom, Greenspan
commented on the recent rise in asset prices
and cautioned that many investors had grown
complacent in their expectations of continued
price appreciation and in requiring less com-
pensation for taking on risk: “History has not
dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted
periods of low risk premiums,” he warned.
It was an innocuous comment in context,
but one that was seized on by media and re-
peated ominously on news programs, some of
which were broadcasting from the hotel’s lawn.
The Federal Reserve, after all, has traditionally
focused on growth, inflation and employment
numbers. Speculation that the central bank
FALL 2005 . TEN 20
AS FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIRMAN, Alan Greenspan attends
Group of Seven, or G7, meetings along with other world finan-
cial leaders, including European Central Bank President Jean-
Claude Trichet (left) and Bank of England Governor Mervyn King
(right). Both men attended the economic symposium in Jackson
Hole, Wyo., where lessons from Greenspan’s tenure was the
theme of the conference.
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 productivity growth well before the data
proved it.
‘Irrational exuberance’
Symposium participants noted that one of
the biggest financial shocks of contemporary
times—the stock market bubble of the late
1990s—occurred during Greenspan’s watch.
Remember the “irrational exuberance” speech?
This leads to a discussion of one of
Greenspan’s philosophies—that it is easier to
“mop up” after bubbles than it is to try to pre-
vent them from forming in the first place.
Some would have suggested the Federal
Reserve should have raised interest
rates to cool down the economy as
asset prices escalated, particularly
during the stock market boom of
the late 1990s. Instead Greenspan
adopted a policy of cutting interest
rates in the aftermath.
Presumably, this philosophy
holds, whether the asset in ques-
tion is stocks or housing.
Which leads to another lesson
that King says can be learned from
Greenspan. That is, a consistent pol-
icy framework will sustain a market
economy over the long term. 
His counterpart from the
European Central Bank agreed.
“A well-designed institutional
framework, which undisputedly
assigns the central bank the pri-
mary objective of price stability,
and the adoption of a clear mone-
tary policy strategy, which
quantitatively defines price stabili-
ty and does not pretend to fine-tune directly
the business cycle, can make the latter type of
policy activism unnecessary in many circum-
stances,” said European Central Bank
President, Jean-Claude Trichet, echoing that
ever-important concept of price stability.
What constitutes price stability? Former
Chairman Paul Volcker defined, and
Greenspan embraced, price stability as an en-
vironment in which inflation is so low and
stable over time that it does not materially
enter into the decisions of households and firms.
In other words, a healthy economic envi-
ronment is one in which inflation is such a
non-issue that people don’t talk about it, said
King. Perhaps this can be applied to a num-
ber of issues—taxes or property rights for
instance, he said.
Future challenges
Whoever becomes the next Chairman of
the Federal Reserve System will have to deal
with many issues—the effects and risks posed
by technological innovation, and the aging of
the U.S. workforce, to name a couple.
But perhaps the repercussions of the trade
imbalance loom largest. Never before has a coun-
try of the United States’ size and advancement
run such a large current account deficit—the dif-
ference between what a country spends on
imports and what it spends on exports. The U.S.
current account has moved from being nearly
balanced in the early 1990s to posting a record
deficit of over $600 billion in early 2005. 
This topic received much discussion at the
economic symposium. In the view of many
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FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIRMAN Alan Greenspan regularly testifies before lawmak-
ers on the state of the economy. Here, he presents a July 1998 midyear report on 
monetary policy to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
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and opens the top drawer in search
of Alan Greenspan’s magic formula,
he will be sorely disappointed,” said
Alan Blinder, who was appointed by
President Bill Clinton to serve as
Federal Reserve Vice Chairman un-
der Greenspan in the 1990s and is
now an economics professor at
Princeton University.
Nevertheless, King, governor of
the Bank of England, cited three lessons
he learned from his counterpart:
“The key is to recognize that
economics tells you how to think,
not what to think,” he began. 
Accordingly, policymakers should
be skeptical that any economic mod-
el accurately describes how the
economy responds to policy. Many
observers say Greenspan’s ability to
not be constrained by specific models
or theories made his term successful.
“Monetary policy under Greenspan
has been remarkably flexible and
adaptable to changing circum-
stances—a point he has frequently
emphasized,” said Blinder.
Responding to the 1998 world
financial crisis by cutting interest
rates three times “was not in the
books,” Blinder said. 
“That was very much ad hoc.
One could argue that it was not ap-
propriate for the U.S. (to cut interest
rates). This could never have been
prescribed by a rule,” said Blinder,
noting that members of the FOMC
were urging Greenspan to tighten. 
The next lesson that King cited
related to Greenspan’s information
gathering. While many economists
are content to rely on econometric
models and official data, it is impor-
tant to use information from a range
of sources. Tapping business leaders
for their observations is essential,
said King, referring to Greenspan’s
ability to detect the upturn in trend
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GREENSPAN TIMELINE
Key events during the Chairman’s tenure
AUGUST 1987
Greenspan sworn in as Chairman of Federal Reserve System.
Dow Industrials at a record: 2,747.
OCTOBER 1987
Black Monday stock market crash—22.6 percent loss is the
steepest dive ever in percentage terms. 
1989
Savings and Loan crisis of 1980s culminated in cleanup plan by
government estimated to have cost from $500 billion to $1 trillion.
JULY 1990 - MARCH 1991—RECESSION
1995
Productivity boom. Greenspan identified this phenomenon, even
though most economists, basing their assessments strictly on 
statistical data, disagreed. 
1994-95
Mexican peso crisis. The Fed, under Greenspan’s direction, 
provided standby liquidity and encouraged corrective action 
on part of others.
DECEMBER 1996
Greenspan speech questions whether “irrational exuberance”
has unduly escalated asset values. 
1997-98
Asian and Brazilian financial crises; 
Greenspan’s Fed increased liquidity.
1998
Russia defaults on debt. Fed lowers rates.
MARCH 1999
Dow Industrials reaches 10,000 milestone.
J ANUARY 2000
Dow Industrials peaks at all-time high: 11,722.
FEBRUARY 2000
U.S. expansion reaches 107th month—the longest on record.
SPRING 2000
Dot-com bubble bursts.
MARCH - NOVEMBER 2001—RECESSION
2001
Terrorism attacks; Fed provided liquidity, guaranteed discount
window would be open. 
JUNE 2003
Fed funds rate cut to 1 percent in response to deflation risk.
SEPTEMBER 2005
FOMC raises Fed funds rate to 3.75 percent with an 11th 
consecutive quarter-point increase.
 would target asset prices was enough to mo-
mentarily move markets.
Why should the central bank concern it-
self with asset prices?
Because the phenomenon of a bubble
forming and then bursting creates and destroys
wealth, distorting resource allocation. In
essence, this affects the Federal Reserve’s target
variables—inflation and output. The Federal
Reserve is interested in asset prices in that they
are another piece of information that indicates
the health of the economy, measured by
growth and inflation.
Greenspan alluded to as much at the
symposium. 
“The configuration of asset prices is al-
ready an integral part of our evaluation of the
large array of forces that influence financial sta-
bility and economic growth,” he said.
However, this does not mean the Federal
Reserve will attempt to pre-empt unsustain-
able increases in asset prices, largely because
it is difficult to discern a bubble until the
bubble has burst. 
Not yet, anyway.
“I certainly do not rule out that future
work could improve our understanding of asset
price behavior, and with it, the conduct of
monetary policy,” said Greenspan.
Data, details and discretion
Greenspan, a former jazz musician, was a
known quantity when President Ronald Reagan
appointed him Chairman of the Federal Reserve
in 1987. He had previously served as Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers for the
Ford administration and had demonstrated a
mastery of data and numbers.
Some have likened leading the Federal
Reserve to driving a car. The governing body
makes decisions regarding inflation and the fed-
eral funds rate target and exerts control to speed
up or slow down the economy as appropriate. 
During the Greenspan era, the nation
experienced only two mild recessions. It’s
been a relatively smooth ride; during his
tenure, inflation fell gradually from roughly
4 percent to 2 percent—achieving the
Federal Reserve’s mission of price stability. 
To accomplish this, he watched an array of
economic statistics such as employment, in-
ventories, orders and shipments. 
Given the weighty challenges the next
Chairman will face, there is keen interest in
learning the keys to the Greenspan Fed’s success.
Monetary Policy 101
Is monetary policy a strategy involving
statistics and analysis, or intuition and hu-
man instinct? Or both? 
“When the next leader of the Fed takes
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FINANCIAL MARKETS MOVE in response to events of the day,
prompting traders such as these in Chicago to listen to Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan for any hint that the central
bank may raise interest rates. 
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O
ne significant change to come out of Alan
Greenspan’s Federal Reserve was a move-
ment to a more open organization. 
During Greenspan’s tenure, the Federal Open
Market Committee—or FOMC—began releasing inter-
est-rate decisions immediately following its meetings. The
first such communication was to announce a rate hike in
February 1994. Concerned that the increase—the first
such hike in 17 months—would shake up markets,
Greenspan told the FOMC they needed to “make cer-
tain that there is no ambiguity about our move.”
Before then, such decisions weren’t announced for at
least six weeks. Fed watchers on Wall Street had to study
measures of the money supply to determine if any tighten-
ing or easing had occurred as a result of the meetings.
Greenspan acknowledged the changing approach
in communications at the symposium.
“We have moved toward greater transparency at a
measured pace, in part because we were concerned
about potential feedback on the policy process and
about being misinterpreted, as indeed we were from time
to time,” he said.
The movement toward greater transparency contin-
ued in May 1999, when the Federal Reserve began to
issue a statement after every FOMC meeting whether or
not the funds rate had been changed.  
In 2003, the Fed ventured further. In May, the
FOMC became concerned about the potential risk of
deflation, and the committee’s postmeeting press release
began to include statements about this outlook. In June
the FOMC lowered the funds rate to a decades-low 1
percent and by August it began to make statements
about the future funds rate operating target. This was a
significant change; the Federal Reserve went from mak-
ing forward-looking statements about economic outlook
to making forward-looking statements about possible fu-
ture policy actions.
Some economists at the symposium suggested the
Federal Reserve should consider further steps toward
openness.
Michael Woodford, professor of economics at
Columbia University, presented a paper titled “Central
Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness,” at the
symposium. He says that what the FOMC has done to
date is not enough.  
“The public’s understanding, not only of what the
central bank is currently doing, but of what it can be ex-
pected to do in the future, is critical for the effectiveness
of policy,” he said.
There appeared to be momentum to the idea of
more open communication. Other speakers also voiced
support for the idea. 
"Long-term interest rates matter more than the feder-
al funds rate, and expectations are better managed if the
market can better anticipate what the central bank will
do in the future," said Alan Blinder, former vice chairman.
Woodford suggested that having inflation targets
would enable central banks to better explain interest rate
decisions, he said.
While a number of countries’ central banks set infla-
tion targets, the United States’ Federal Reserve has
stopped short of announcing an explicit numerical infla-
tion objective.
However, a future chairman may believe that publi-
cizing inflation targets could be a useful communication
tool and policy strategy.
What does Greenspan think of such an approach?
He touched on the topic at the symposium.
“To date, we have chosen not to formulate explicit
inflation targets, in part, out of concern that they could in-
hibit effective pursuit of our goal.”
BY TONI LAPP, SENIOR WRITER
a more transparent Federal Reserve Toward 
“The public’s understanding, not
only of what the central bank is
currently doing, but of what it can
be expected to do in the future, is
critical for the effectiveness of 
policy.”
—Michael Woodford
Tparticipants, erasing the trade deficit will be
painful. Large current account deficits are fi-
nanced through the inflow of capital from
foreign investors purchasing U.S. securities. If
the flow of capital were to stop suddenly, the dol-
lar could depreciate and inflationary pressures
might build. This could lead the Federal Reserve
to raise short-term interest rates which, in turn,
could slow economic growth in the United
States and possibly the rest of the world. 
While there are no modern historical
precedents for a country as large as the United
States running very large and persistent current
account deficits, there are numerous examples
of current account reversals among smaller
countries in both the industrial and developing
world. And the experience of these countries
does not bode well for the United States.
Previous episodes of current account rebalanc-
ing in both industrial and developing countries
have been associated with a depreciation of the
exchange rate and a temporary reduction in
real GDP growth. Effects on inflation and in-
terest rates vary depending on the size of the
country and whether it is industrialized, noted
Sebastian Edwards, professor at the University
of California-Los Angeles.
A reduction in the trade deficit will in-
clude simultaneous adjustments in savings
and investment in the United States and the
rest of the world, along with changes in ex-
change rates. In addition, to ensure that the
adjustment is gradual, most participants felt
that policymakers should resist protectionist
trade measures and work toward further
trade liberalization.
Greenspan himself had some thoughts
about the current account deficit, and noted
that the correlation between increases in
home equity extraction and the current ac-
count deficit suggests that the end of the
housing boom “could induce a significant
rise in the personal saving rate, a decline in
imports, and a corresponding improvement
in the current account deficit.” 
Whether the decline will be orderly or
abrupt will depend on maintaining, if not in-
creasing, the flexibility of economic
institutions in the United States and abroad,
he said.
Farewell, Chairman
About 150 participants attended the 2005
symposium, and while some proclaimed the
guest of honor to be possibly the greatest cen-
tral banker ever, others stopped short of such
heroic terms. In the end, only the passing of
years will determine Greenspan’s legacy.
Over the course of two days, Greenspan
sat near the back of the conference hall and
took it all in. Although he might have raised
his profile by injecting himself into the discus-
sions that followed the presentations, he
quietly observed.
Except for the occasional autograph seeker
hanging around outside the meeting hall, he
attended the symposium with little fanfare, ad-
dressing the participants at the beginning and
then at the end. His concluding remarks were
met with a standing ovation, as close as you get
to hero worship in a crowd of economists, aca-
demics and central bankers.
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Monetary policy under Greenspan has been remarkably
flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances.
“
“